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PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR REHEARING
POINTS OF FACT OVERLOOKED OR MISAPPREHENDED
BY COURT OF APPEALS
The points of fact overlooked or misapprehended by the Court
of Appeals are as follows:
1.
There is no evidence or substantial evidence to support
the Court's conclusion that the Utah State Retirement Office
distributed two flyers, (see Court's Opinion, first paragraph page
two) In connection herewith, there is no evidence to support the
conclusion that the second flier entitled "Employees Group
Insurance Bulletin", allegedly dated June 20, 1978 was ever
distributed to the American Fork Training School state employees.
2.
There is no evidence or substantial evidence to support
the Courtfs conclusion that notice of or knowledge of the effective
date of the proposed new life insurance program was ever made known
to the state employees at the American Fork Training School during
the enrollment period (which ended June 30, 1978).
3.
There is no evidence or substantial evidence to support
the Court's erroneous conclusion that the alleged second flyer,
dated June 20, 1978, was "routinely circulated to state employees
in their paychecks." In this connection, there is absolutely no
evidence to support the contention that the alleged second flyer
was ever
obtained
by
the American
Fork Training
School
Representative who came to Salt Lake to pick up the paychecks, let
alone any evidence to support the contention or conclusion that the
second flyer was ever distributed.

4.
The conclusion of the Court in the third paragraph, page
two of the opinion is unclear as to the interpretation of the Blue
Brochure, however, a finding by the Appellate Court that Blue
Brochure was "not ambiguous" does not ipso facto lead to the
conclusion that a state employee could ascertain therefrom the
effective date of the new insurance coverage (certainly not a
specific inception date of July 16, 1978).
POINTS OF LAW OVERLOOKED OR MISAPPREHENDED
BY THE APPELLATE COURT
5.
The Kloepfer v. Continental Assurance Company case is
not factually similar to the Thelma Johnson case, except in the
sole respect that both are group insurance cases.
There, the
similarity ends.
6.
Without the alleged "second flyer dated June 20, 1978,"
there is no evidence from which the Court can conclude as a matter
of law that there was any specific effective date other than what
may be implied from the ordinary person's understanding of the
language of the Blue Brochure.
7.
The evidence before the Court in the form of affidavits
submitted by Plaintiff and affidavits submitted by Defendants can
lead to one of only two possible conclusions: (1) that the alleged
"second flyer" was never distributed; or (2) that there exists a
genuine issue of material fact with regard to the existence of
and/or distribution of the alleged "second flyer," in which case
the matter should be remanded to the Trial Court for the purpose
of an evidentiary hearing, at least on that point.
It is
impossible to conclude from a reading of the ten affidavits that
any evidence or substantial evidence exists in favor of the
Defendants claim that the second brochure was distributed or
existed.
ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
No Evidence of Second Flyer
1.

The Court has incorrectly and erroneously concluded that

there were two flyers.

The Court has erroneously concluded that

the flyer entitled "Employee's Group Insurance Bulletin", allegedly
dated June 20, 1978 was distributed to the American Fork Training
School State Employees.

There is not one scintilla of evidence in
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the Court file supporting this conclusion.

Even the Defendants

admit in their joint "Motion for Summary Disposition" on appeal as
follows:
Appellant claims that a contested fact is whether or not
her decedent ever received the group insurance bulletin
(Ex. C) [the alleged second flyer] and indeed there is
no proof that he did, (see p. 6 therein) [emphasis added]
The best and most persuasive evidence in the Court file is the
Affidavit

of

Dave

Pearson

of

the

Utah

Commissioner's Office dated February 12, 1987.

State

Insurance

In paragraph 4

therein he states:
Upon employment in this office on November 3, 1969, I
set up a file into which I deposited insurance items or
other medical related items. When the issue arose in
this lawsuit, I remembered that I had such a slip and
retrieved it on the spot to find that the date was indeed
July 1, 1978. I not only distinctly remember receiving
the Blue Brochure together with the blue enrollment card
and payroll deduction authorization form, but further
state that I have nothing else in my file, and that I,
to the best of my recollection, never received any other
white sheet or bulletin or other notice of any kind
informing me that there was any other date for the
commencement of the Gem State Life Insurance than the
date contained in the Blue Bulletin, which date was July
1, 1978.
2.

Further, the Affidavit of Melba Hatfield dated February

11, 1987 states in pertinent part:
I distinctly recall receiving a small Blue Brochure or
pamphlet together with a small blue enrollment card and
payroll deduction authorization form in the spring of
1978.
A copy of said Brochure is attached hereto as
Exhibit A...I received no other written or oral notice
from any source that the insurance coverage offered in
the Blue Brochure would begin or commence on any date
other than the date in the brochure which was July 1,
1978.
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3.

The Affidavit of Bryant Johnson states as follows:
During the spring and summer of 1978 I was employed as
Program Director at the American Fork Training School,
and as a state employee. I remember distinctly receiving
the Blue Brochure.. . I know for a fact that my father, the
deceased, Douglas Johnson, filled out the enrollment card
and payroll deduction authorization and timely filed it
with the State of Utah through the Retirement Board. I
had conversations, not only with my father and mother,
but with other state employees at the time. All of us
understood the Blue Brochure containing the date of July
1, 1978 to mean that if the enrollment card was filed
with the state prior to July 1, 1978, that the life
insurance amount enrolled for with Gem State would
commence or become effective on the date of July L, 1978.
No other date was contained in the Blue Brochure or any
information which I received from the state.
I was
unaware at the time of any other written or oral notice
of any other alleged effective date for the Gem State
insurance to commence, and from my conversations with
others, was unaware that anyone had been notified of any
other effective date for the insurance other than July
1, 1978.

4.

From

the

above

quotes, and

others

contained

in

the

Affidavits filed in support of the Plaintiff's claim, it is clear
that there was no distribution of a June 20, 1978 "Employees Group
Insurance Bulletin." All of these Affidavits are based on personal
knowledge and not upon beliefs and speculations.
5.

In contrast to the direct affidavit evidence offered by

the Plaintiff,

the

Defendants

submitted

Affidavits

which

were

conjectural and speculative, and which were submitted by people
who were neither present at the American Fork Training School, nor
involved directly in any way with the alleged distribution of the
July 20, 1978 bulletin, or dealt with other non-related matters.
For instance, the Affidavits of Ray S. George, Clara Moss, and
Patricia A. Myers make no mention of the alleged second flyer.
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The

only other affidavit submitted by the Defendants was that of Lynn
Baker, who testified by affidavit only as to general procedures.
There is no direct affidavit testimony in the affidavit of Lynn
Baker wherein he states that he had any personal knowledge that the
alleged second flyer or bulletin was ever actually distributed to
the American Fork Training School.

He spoke only in terms of what

"would have happened".
6.

In short, there is absolutely no positive proof of any

kind that the alleged second flyer was ever distributed to the
American Fork Training School employees, rather, to the contrary,
the actual eye witness, first-hand-knowledge testimony comes from
the state employee affidavits submitted by the Plaintiff proving
that there was no distribution of the said bulletin.
7.

At the very least, the Court must conclude that this is

a contested issue of fact, and remand the matter back to the Trial
Court for the taking of evidence and a proper determination.

The

only other possible conclusion which could be reached is one which
believes the Plaintiff's affidavits and concludes that there was
no distribution of the second flyer allegedly dated June 20, 1978.
How can this appelate Court conclude as the touchstone fact in its
decision that the alleged second flyer existed and was distributed
when

such

a

conclusion

is

contrary

admissions of the Defendants?

5

to

the

evidence

and

the

POINT TWO
State Employees Had No
Knowledge of the Effective Date
8.

Absent proof showing an actual distribution of the June

20, 1978 bulletin to the American Fork Training School, there is
no evidence in the Court file to support any contention that the
state employees there had any knowledge of the effective date of
the new Gem State Life Insurance program (see the arguments under
Point one).

POINT THREE
No Evidence That Second Flyer was
Routinely Circulated in Paychecks
9.

The Court, in it's Opinion, stated that the second flyer

was "routinely circulated to state employees in their paychecks."
It seems clear from the language used by the Court--"in
paychecks"—

that

the

Appellate

Court

has

the

their

impression

or

misapprehension that the paychecks were somehow put in envelopes
and that the flyers were put in the envelopes with the paychecks.
This is not how the paychecks and any other flyers or information
was distributed to the American Fork Training School employees in
1978.
The distribution of paychecks in 1978 at the American Fork
Training

School

disorganized

was,

approach.

at

best,
A

a

helter

representative

skelter,
would

pick

somewhat
up

the

paychecks from the payroll department at the State Capital and
6

would set them on a table in the cafeteria at the American Fork
Training School.

Employees would simply file by the table and

would be handed their paycheck, which was not in an envelope.
the checks were simply in a large stack or pile.

All

If there were

other flyers or information, they were in a stack on another table
or at a different point at the cafeteria, and
weren't anywhere.

sometimes they

There was no rhyme or reason or organization to

the distribution, and there is absolutely no evidence before the
Appellate Court to prove that the June 20, 1978 bulletin was ever
even distributed through this helter skelter process in June of
1978 at the American Fork Training School.
Again, if this is assumed to be a fact by the Appellate Court,
it should be noted

that there is no evidence

to support

that

assumption, and that the Plaintiff strongly contests the fact of
the distribution, and therefore the matter should be remanded to
the Trial Court for the taking of evidence.
POINT FOUR
Ambiguity of Blue Brochure
10.

This Appellate Court has failed to make any analysis of

the contract elements concerning the offer and acceptance which
was

effected

during

the

enrollment

existence of the Master Policy.

period

and

prior

to

the

Absent the proof of the existence

or distribution of the second flyer, allegedly dated June 20, 1978,
an issue arises which has not been resolved by the Appellate Court.
In spite of the finding of the Appellate Court that the language
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in the Blue Brochure is "not ambiguous", it does not follow that,
absent the second flyer, the state employee had any notice or
knowledge of the effective date of the insurance other than the
implied date of July 1, 1978, A finding that the Blue Brochure was
"not ambiguous" does not ipso facto lead to the conclusion that a
state employee could ascertain therefrom the effective date of the
new insurance coverage, and certainly not the specific
inception date of July

16, 1978.

The effective

alleged

date must be

construed in favor of insurance coverage under such a circumstance.

POINTS FIVE, SIX AND SEVEN
Kloepfer case not factually similar
Absent proof of second flyer—
no basis to conclude July 16th effective date
Affidavits
11.

The Kloepfer vs. Continental Assurance Co., 23 Ut.2d 178,

460 P.2d 337 (1969), is not factually similar to the Thelma Johnson
case, except in the sole respect that both are group insurance
cases.
12.

An analysis and comparison of the two cases discloses

that there are fourteen factual differences between the Kloepfer
case and the Johnson case, and only one similarity (See Exhibit A
attached hereto).
13.

As can be seen clearly from Exhibit A, every

single

factual element of the Kloepfer case and the Johnson case are
different or opposite, with the sole exception that they are both
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Group Life Insurance policies.

The conclusion of the Appellate

Court that the cases are factually similar is erroneous and wrong.
The Thelma Johnson case is a case of first impression in the State
of Utah.
14.

Furthermore, the Appellate Court's conclusion that the

Davison v. Business Men's Assurance Co. 85 NM 796, 518 P.2d 776
(1974) case is factually similar is equally erroneous.

A careful

reading of that case discloses that it is similar to the Kloepfer
case in it's factual elements, including but not limited to the
fact that meetings were held with county employees in which the
effective dates for proposed applicants were disclosed in advance;
evidence of insurability was required; an advance application or
request for insurance was required from each prospective insured;
and the Master Policy, which existed in advance of those meetings,
contained provisions allowing for the calculation of the effective
dates.

The Davison case has one fact which is similar to the

Johnson case, which is that a payroll deduction form was apparently
submitted by the prospective enrollee.
required

to

submit a request

for

However, Davidson was also

insurance

and

the

insurance

company was required to find the proof of insurability submitted
by Davison as satisfactory.

None of those other facts are similar

to the Johnson case at bar.
15.

In contrast to the comparison between the Kloepfer and

Johnson cases, supra, a careful factual comparison between the
Gladden case, infra, and the Johnson case at bar will show that
the case most factually similar to the Johnson case is indeed the
9

Gladden case, which was presented to the Trial Court and to the
Appellate Court in Plaintiff's Briefe

(See Exhibit B attached

hereto.)
16.

As can be seen from the factual comparison between the

Gladden and Johnson cases

(Exhibit B) , the Johnson case is very

similar factually to the Gladden case.
a case of first impression in Utah —

Since the Johnson case is

that assertion is made based

upon the fact that none of the litigants in the case at bar have
presented any case, besides Gladden, which is factually similar to
the Johnson case, and none of the parties have been able to find
or advance to the Court any Utah case which is factually similar
to the Johnson case —

the Court must look to a non-Utah case in

order to find a proper resolution for the Johnson case.

That case

is Gladden, supra.
In resolving the Gladden case, the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals engaged in an analysis of contract law, which analysis is
necessary

in order to properly resolve the Johnson case.

analysis was one of contract

law elements

The

in which the Fourth

Circuit Court analyzed the fact that in Gladden there was an offer
of insurance, an acceptance by the enrol lee under conditions where
the enrollee was never allowed or given the opportunity to see the
Master Policy.

Each of those facts and all of the facts set forth

in the factual comparison chart

(Exhibit B) demonstate enormous

similarities between the Gladden case and the Johnson case.

This

Appellate Court glossed over and failed to make any analysis of the
offer and acceptance and other contract elements in order to arrive
10

at an answer to the ultimate issue in this lawsuit, which concerns
itself with the question of the effective date. It is insufficient
and erroneous to simply conclude that there was a second flier and
therefore the effective date was July 16, 1978. There is a glaring
and obvious dispute of a material fact concerning the existence and
distribution of the second flyer.

That matter should be remanded

to the Trial Court. The only other possible resolution would have
to be in favor of Thelma Johnson. With that in mind, it cannot be
concluded that the enrollees during the enrollment period had any
knowledge of or any notice of the effective date of the proposed
insurance, except the implied effective date of July 1, 1978
contained in the Blue Brochure. Therefore, it is inappropriate to
simply conclude, without analysis, as this Court did in it!s
Opinion, that the effective date is July 16, 1978.
17.

The glaring

Appellate Court, is

issue, not adequately

addressed

by the

"when was the coverage effective on the life

of Douglas Johnson." In comparing the Johnson case to the Kloepfer
case, supra and the Davison case, supra, one glaring difference is
immediately obvious.

In both the Kloepfer and Davison cases the

Master Policy existed prior to the date of application by the
prospective insureds, and the effective date and/or the method of
calculating the effective date was disclosed to the insureds in
advance of their making application for insurance.

None of these

facts are similar to the Johnson case.
18.

In the Johnson case at bar, the Master Policy did not

exist during the enrollment period. The effective date was unknown
11

and not disclosed to any of the state employees prior to the end
of

the

enrollment

period

(the Defendents

have

presented

no

credible, believable evidence rebutting the Plaintiff's evidence
that no second flyer existed or was distributed to the American
Fork Training School employees).
IN CONCLUSION:

The case analysis and comparison by the

Appellate Court in the Johnson case at bar is erroneous and wrong.
It improperly finds as similar cases whose facts are entirely
different and even opposite the facts of the Johnson case.

The

only factually similar case which has been presented to the Trial
Court and the Appellate Court is the case of Gladden v. Pargas,
Inc. of Waldorf

Maryland

v. The Hartford

Insurance Co., 575 F.2d 1091 (1978).

Life

and

Accident

The Kloepfer case has one

similarity (it's a Group policy) and eleven factual differences.
In contradistinction

to that, the Gladden case has only one

difference (it's a Disability Group policy rather than a Life Group
policy) and fourteen factual similarities.

It is overwhelmingly

evident from a review of the facts in each of the above-cited cases
that the Thelma Johnson case at bar is most similar to the Gladden
case, supra, and the resolution of the Thelma Johnson case should
mirror or reflect the conclusion of the Gladden case, which was
that the employee was covered by the group insurance, and is
entitled to the benefits of the policy coverage.
Respectfully submitted this ^ ^
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day of September, 1989.

ARRDN F. JEPSON/'
Attorney for Plaintiff/
Appellant/Petitioner
MAILING/SERVICE CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I caused four true and correct copies
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257 East 200 South, Suite 850
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2048
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EXHIBIT A
KLOEPFER CASE

THELMA JOHNSON CASE
Similarities

Group Life policy

Group Life policy
Differences

Required application on
company form

No "application" form

Applicant must submit evidence
of insurability

Open enrollment (no evidence
of insurability required)

Insurance company had to
determine whether submitted
evidence of insurability was
satisfactory

Open enrollment (automatic
acceptance of all enrollees

Insurance company sent Notice
of Acceptance to applicant
with notice of inception or
effective date

No notice of effective date
given; no notice of acceptance
required from insurance
company

Effective date disclosed to
application in advance and was
mathmatically calculable or
certain at time of application

Effective date unknown during
enrollment period (implied
date of July 1, 1978 was known
from Blue Brochure)

Master Policy issued 1 1/2
years before Kloepfer made
application for insurance

Master Policy did not exist
during enrollment period

Premium payment required with
application (no credit)

Credit extended by insurance
company with offer of
insurance (no advanced
preimium payment required)

Existing Master Policy
provided computation basis for
effective date (available for
inspection and terms disclosed
to applicant in advance of
application)

Master Policy non-existent
during enrollment period and
terms of Master Policy and
effective date NOT disclosed
to prospective enrollees.

Consideration was advanced
premium payment

Consideration was payroll
deduction authorization and
continued employment (i.e„,
Johnson continued employment
after enrolling on June 9,
1978)

No offer of insurance or
solicitation

Gem State offered and
solicitated enrollees with
Blue Brochure

Only two parties-—insurance
company and employee

Three parties—insurance
company, employer (Retirement
Board, so named in Master
policy), and employee

ii

EXHIBIT B
GLADDEN CASE

THELMA JOHNSON CASE
Simil

ities

Group policy

Group Policy

Enrollment form signed and
submitted by employee

Enrollment form signed and
submitted by employee

Employee never given
opportunity to receive or see
copy of Master Policy

Employee never given
opportunity to receive or see
copy of Master Policy (it did
not exist)

After enrollment premiums
deducted from pay

After enrollment premiums
deducted from pay

Enrollment form and brochure
was offer of insurance company
to employee

Enrollment form and brochure
was offer of insurance company
to employee (Blue Brochure
with tear off enrollment form)

Plaintiff accepted offer with
his signature on the
enrollment form

Plaintiff's decedent accepted
offer with his signature on
the enrollment form

No application required

No application required

No proof of insurability
required

No proof of insurability
required

Insurance company did not have
to determine satisfaction of
proof of insurability

Insurance company did not have
to determine satisfaction of
proof of insurability

No notice of acceptance
required from insurance
company

No notice of acceptance
required from insurance
company

Credit theory part of offer
(i.e., payroll deduction
authorized by signature on
enrollment card)

Credit theory part of offer
(i.e., payroll deduction
authorized by signature on
enrollment card)

No advanced premium payment
required at time of enrollment

No advanced premium payment
required at time of enrollment

Consideration was payroll
deduction authorization and
continued employment

Consideration was payroll
deduction authorization and
continued enrollment

Three parties/entities
involved—insurance company,
employer, and employee

Three parties/entities
involved—insurance company,
employer, and employee

Differences
Group coverage was disability
(not a relevant difference
from the Johnson case)

Group coverage was life

